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Abstract
Rabies was eliminated from Japan in 1957. In the 60 years since elimination, vaccination
coverage has declined and dog ownership habits have changed. The purpose of this study
was to assess the current risk of rabies spread in Japan. A spatially explicit transmission
model was developed at the 1 km2 grid scale for Hokkaido and Ibaraki Prefectures.
Parameters associated with dog movement and bite injuries were estimated using historical
records from Japan, and were used with previously published epidemiological parameters.
The final epidemic size, efficacy of rabies contingency plans and the influence of dog
owner responses to incursions were assessed by the model. Average outbreak sizes for dog
rabies were 3.1 and 4.7 dogs in Hokkaido and Ibaraki Prefectures, respectively. Average num-
ber of bite injury cases were 4.4 and 6.7 persons in Hokkaido and Ibaraki Prefectures, respect-
ively. Discontinuation of mandatory vaccination increased outbreak sizes in these prefectures.
Sensitivity analyses showed that higher chance of unintentional release of rabid dogs by their
owners (from 0.5 to 0.9 probability) increased outbreak size twofolds. Our model outputs sug-
gested that at present, incursions of rabies into Japan are very unlikely to cause large out-
breaks. Critically, the reaction of dog owners to their dogs developing rabies considerably
impacts the course of outbreaks. Contingency measures should therefore include sensitisation
of dog owners.
Introduction
Rabies is a fatal zoonotic disease. Every year 59 000 people are estimated to die of rabies trans-
mitted by domestic dogs, mostly in Asia and Africa [1]. The main reservoir hosts for rabies are
domestic dogs in low- and middle-income countries, but wild animals including foxes, rac-
coons, skunks and raccoon dogs also maintain rabies in some parts of the world [2].
Historically, measures for controlling dog rabies have included dog population management,
movement restriction and vaccination [3]. Dog vaccination is the most effective control meas-
ure [4, 5]. Today, rabies mostly circulates in countries where large-scale dog vaccinations have
not been undertaken, and has emerged in unvaccinated dog populations in previously rabies-
free areas [6, 7].
Japan has been free from rabies since 1957 [8], following rigorous implementation of con-
trol measures under the Rabies Prevention Act, which was enacted in 1950. This act includes
dog registration, capture of free-roaming dogs, mandatory dog vaccination and quarantine of
animals brought into the country. In Japan, free-roaming dogs can still be found, and they are
captured by local government employees. Average number of captured dogs per year in entire
Japan between 2012 and 2016 was 45 193 [9]. Dog vaccinations were performed twice per year
until 1985, and dog vaccination coverage remained high until 1995 [10]. The long absence of
rabies from Japan has weakened public interest in rabies control measures, however, and based
on reported numbers of vaccinated dogs and the estimated total dog population in Japan,
including non-registered dogs, overall vaccination coverage in Japan has declined to <50%
[10, 11].
There is therefore growing concern about the elevated risk of rabies spreading following the
introduction of a rabid dog into Japan – though the risk of such an introduction is considered
to be very low [8]. Compared with the time when rabies was endemic in Japan, many more
dog owners confine their dogs inside and the number of stray dogs has substantially reduced
[9, 12]. Therefore, the current risk of rabies spreading in Japan has likely changed considerably
compared with the historical risk. The aims of our study were to assess, using infectious dis-
ease modelling, (1) the risk of rabies spread in Japan in the event of a rabid dog being intro-
duced, and (2) the efficacy of current contingency plans to prevent an outbreak, which include
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epidemiological survey to detect suspected dogs contacted with an
index and subsequent cases, emergency vaccination and capture
of free-roaming dogs.
Methods and materials
Study site selection
Ibaraki and Hokkaido Prefectures were selected for this study
(Fig. 1). Ibaraki Prefecture was chosen because vaccination cover-
age is low (51.8%, Table 1), and more free-roaming dogs are cap-
tured annually in the prefecture than any other in Japan [11, 12].
Hokkaido Prefecture was also chosen because of the frequency of
visits to its ports by fishing vessels from Russia, where rabies is
endemic [8]. In Hokkaido Prefecture, estimated vaccination
coverage is higher than in Ibaraki Prefecture (56.3%, Table 1),
but many free-roaming dogs are captured annually [9, 11].
Data collection
Demographic and epidemiological data including numbers of
registered dogs, vaccination coverage among registered dogs and
numbers of stray dogs captured per city/town/village (shi/cho/
son) administrative unit in 2013 were collected from both prefec-
tures. Numbers of captured stray dogs may not accurately reflect
total numbers of stray dogs in an area, but was used as a
best-estimate proxy. Vaccination coverage was calculated from
the recorded number of vaccinated dogs and the estimated total
dog population [11].
This study used historical data on rabies epidemics in Osaka
Prefecture between 1914 and 1915, from prefectural reports and
newspapers, described elsewhere [13]. The 1914 dog population
was collected from newspaper reports [13] and the human popu-
lation from the 1920 census [14].
To estimate the public health impact of rabies, public libraries
were visited, and newspaper and public reports published in
Fig. 1. Hokkaido and Ibaraki Prefectures in Japan and potential high-risk characteristics of prefectures, specifically: (a) the number of owned dogs, (b) the number
of stray dogs and (c) vaccination coverage.
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Tokyo and the surrounding prefectures between 1893 and 1954
were surveyed for descriptions of the numbers of persons bitten
by individual rabid dogs. The newspaper and public records
describing number of bite injury cases by a single rabid dog in
detail were extracted from these data and were used for the
analysis.
The model
We used an individual-based model to simulate the spread of
rabies on a 1-by-1 km grid representing the geography of the
study prefectures, as adapted from a previous study [5]. Each
cell included demographic and epidemiological information,
such as the human and dog population densities and vaccination
coverage within the city/township administrative unit. Dog popu-
lation was assumed to be static in the model because majority of
owned dogs are sterilised or castrated and kept inside in Japan.
Although stray dogs are less neutered (previously owned stray
dogs may be neutered), contribution of turnover of stray dogs
to entire dog population in Japan is limited because stray dog
population is much smaller than that of owned dogs. Moreover,
the period of interest for this risk assessment is first several
months until the elimination after a rabies incursion.
For every simulated case, the number of secondary cases was
determined by drawing from a negative binomial distribution
with mean equal to the basic reproductive number, R0.
Secondary cases are allocated to grid cells according to a dispersal
kernel that was estimated from a study in Tanzanian [15] and his-
torical record in Osaka, and become infectious after the serial
interval, Ts, elapses. Estimation of R0 and Ts (Table 2) from his-
torical epidemics in Osaka Prefecture is described elsewhere [13].
All analyses were conducted using R, version 3.1.0 [18].
Initialisation
The total number of owned and stray dogs staying outside at a
given time in each grid cell is denoted dogsi and cases cannot
exceed this number. To calculate dogsi, dogs were classified
into: (a) dogs that are always kept indoors, (b) dogs that go out-
doors only for walks, (c) dogs occasionally kept outdoors, (d) dogs
always kept outdoors and (e) stray dogs, and the registered dogs in
each administrative unit were proportionally categorised into a, b,
c and d according to the published data that estimated the propor-
tions of owned dogs in these categories [12]. Dogs were assigned
within a cell according to these proportions, with the estimated
number of dogs in a given administrative unit equally allocated
across the cells within that unit. Dogs in category a were assumed
to never have contact with a rabid dog and were removed from
dogsi. The number of dogs outdoors in category b (NOut,i) at a
given time was modelled using a binomial distribution, with the
number of dogs in category b in cell i Nb,i, and the probability
of being outdoors at a given time PW, calculated from published
data on daily time spent walking [15]:
Nout, i = binom Nb, i, Pw
( )
. (1)
Stray dogs (e) in each administrative unit were allocated ran-
domly to the cells within it. Thus, dogsi is described as:
dogsi = NOut,i + ci + di + ei
( )
/area of administrative unit i.
(2)
Table 1. Characteristics of Hokkaido and Ibaraki Prefectures
Items Hokkaido Ibaraki
Area (km2) 77 282 5878
Human population 5 454 447 2 941 109
Human population density (/km2) 70.6 500.4
Number of stray dogs 1089 2181
Estimated total dog population 352 662 232 683
Density of dogs (dogs/km2) 4.6 39.6
Vaccination coverage (%) 56.3 51.8
Proportion of dogs registered (%) 80.8 79.0
Table 2. Model parameters and distributions used in the default model (Ibaraki Prefecture with vaccination coverage at 0%)
Items Parameters/distributions (unit) Source
Reproduction number Gamma distribution (shape = 24.6, rate = 9.87) (dog); R0 = 2.42
(90% CI 1.94–2.91)
[13]
Serial interval Gamma (shape = 1.41, rate = 0.03) (day) [13]
Dispersion kernel Gamma (shape = 0.215, scale = 4.08) (km) [16]
Mixing parameter (α) 0.5 Estimated
Adjusting parameter for dog population (δ) 0.73 Estimated
Adjusting parameter for dispersion kernel (ε) 1.13 Estimated
Walking time with dog per day Beta (shape 1 = 0.01, shape 2 = 0.5) (h) [17]
Delay of initial action 30 days Assumption
Probability of detection in outbreak investigation Binomial (P = 0.5, n = Ndet) (dog) Assumption
The number of captured dogs Poisson (λ = 10) (dog) Assumption
The number of vaccinated dogs Poisson (λ = 100) (dog) Assumption
Probability of releasing a rabid owned dog 50% Assumption
Probability that a rabid stray dog selects a stray dog to bite 50% Assumption
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For category c, the published data [12] did not show how often the
dogs were outside, and dogs in category c were dealt as same as d
in the model.
When an owned dog was bitten, the vaccination status of the
dog was stochastically assigned using the vaccination coverage
of the model. Vaccinated animals were assumed not to develop
rabies if bitten by a rabid dog. Stray dogs were assumed to all
be unvaccinated.
Parameterisation
Locations of secondary cases were assigned according to the dis-
tances from primary cases assuming preferential movement
towards areas of higher dog population density, as previous
study showed a significant positive relationship between the num-
ber of dog rabies cases and dog density [13]. Therefore, the prob-
ability of secondary cases occurring in cell i, Pri was:
Pri = a× dKOSi + 1− a( )ddensi∑n
i=1 a× dKOSi+ 1− a( )ddensi{ }
, (3)
where: dKOSi is the likelihood of the distance between primary and
secondary cases, according to the dispersal kernel derived from
the historical epidemic in Osaka [13]; densi is the dog population
density in cell i; the parameter α characterises the influence of dog
population density on secondary case locations, taking a value
between 0 and 1; and δ is a tuning constant. dKOS was modelled
modifying a γ distributed dispersal kernel reported from Tanzania
[17]. The shape parameter of a γ distribution represents numbers
of events, and the scale parameter the time duration [16], or dis-
tance for a dispersal kernel. Thus dKOS was modelled as:
dKOS = g v, 1w( ), (4)
where ε adjusts the distance between primary and secondary cases
in Tanzania [17] to the historical Osaka epidemic [13]. The dis-
tance between primary and secondary cases in Osaka Prefecture
was calculated from the centroids of the administrative units
where cases occurred, as exact locations were not available. Dog
population data at the zone/township/village administrative unit
were not available, but only the total dog population for Osaka
Prefecture. A constant dog-to-human ratio was therefore assumed
for all locations, based on the dog population in 1914 described in
a newspaper as over a hundred thousand dogs and human popu-
lation census in 1920 [14] (100 000 vs. 2 887 496). Dogs were allo-
cated to each unit accordingly. The parameters α, ε and δ were
optimised using the optim() function of R [18] to minimise the
χ2 value:
x2 =
∑n
j=1
Oj − Ej
( )2
Ej
, (5)
where n is the total number of administrative units in Osaka
Prefecture in 1914 and Oj the number of reported rabies cases
in administrative unit, j. Expected rabies cases, Ej, in each admin-
istrative unit, with a particular parameter set were obtained from
1000 iterations of the simulation. Estimated parameters were vali-
dated by using the χ2 test to verify that there was no significant
difference between the numbers of simulated and reported cases
in each administrative unit [19].
Two other aspects relating to the behaviour of rabid dogs and
their owners was modelled. In Japan, owned dogs kept indoors are
confined and those kept outdoors are leashed. Therefore, if the
owner of an infected dog does not release it, the risk of secondary
cases is negligible. However, a rabid dog may accidentally be
released by its owner, therefore unintended release was modelled.
If a stray dog becomes rabid, the dog may tend to bite stray dogs,
which are more accessible than owned dogs. Rabid owned dogs
were modelled to bite owned and stray dogs with probabilities
corresponding to the proportions of owned and stray dogs in
each cell; whereas, rabid stray dogs were modelled to bite stray
and owned dogs with equal probability despite a greater propor-
tion of dogs being owned. This assumption was made because
stray dogs remain in remote and non-residential areas in Japan,
and they tend to live in groups of stray dogs.
Risk assessment
To assess the current risk of dog rabies spread, vaccination cover-
age in the contemporary dog population was used. The probabil-
ity of unintended release of a rabid dog was set as 50%, as there
was no prior information on this probability. The models for
Hokkaido and Ibaraki Prefectures were each run for 1000 itera-
tions, and outbreak sizes recorded when all cases had either
died or been captured. To assess the efficacy of rabies control
measures, vaccination coverage was reduced to 0% to reflect dis-
continuation of the current mandatory vaccination scheme and
compared with the status quo.
The initial response to a rabies outbreak is, by law, an imme-
diate epidemiological investigation by the prefectural government
to search for dogs contacted by the index case. This involves
detection of secondary dog rabies cases, capture of stray dogs
and emergency vaccination of dogs around the area of the
detected case(s). Four outbreak response parameters were
explored to assess the efficacy of contingency plans: (1) time
until the response, (2) ability to detect rabid dogs and dogs con-
tacted by rabid dogs, (3) speed of capturing stray dogs and (4)
speed of emergency vaccination. In this assessment, only
Ibaraki Prefecture was modelled, as Hokkaido Prefecture has
much larger land and computation time was very long.
Vaccination coverage was set to 0% because under current cover-
age, too few cases were generated to assess the effect of outbreak
responses.
The daily number of detected rabid dogs and dogs contacted
by rabid dogs was modelled using a binomial distribution,
where the total number of rabid and contacted dogs in a cell is
denoted as NCont (Table 2). Investigations were modelled as
being implemented within a 5 km radius from the centroid of
the cell with the detected case, on the basis of discussions with
responsible prefectural government officers. Both the speed of
capturing stray dogs and of emergency vaccinations were mod-
elled as the number of dogs captured or vaccinated per day,
drawn from Poisson distributions (Table 2). We assumed that
vaccinated dogs became immune 14 days post-vaccination.
Different scenarios were tested to assess the efficacy of contin-
gency plans, agreed upon as plausible scenarios through discus-
sions with prefectural government officers (Table 3). Each
scenario was simulated 1000 times and each index case was ran-
domly generated.
To assess the risk of rabid dog bite injuries, two approaches
were taken: ((1) stochastic approach) each rabid dog generated
in the model was assigned either it bit at least one person or
4 H. Kadowaki et al.
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not, and the number of people to bite if the dog was assigned to
bite, and ((2) ratio approach) according to the bite injury cases –
rabid dog ratio (0.83 persons/rabid dog; 3805 victims vs. 4584
rabid dogs) reported in the past epidemic in Osaka Prefecture
[13], the number of bite injury cases was calculated using the
dog rabies outbreak size for each simulation. For the stochastic
approach, rabid dogs were stochastically assigned to bite with
the probability of 25.7% based on the published report (of 1000
rabid dogs, 743 dogs do not bite people) [20], and the number
of bite injuries by a rabid dog was modelled using bootstrapping
of 116 historical records from Tokyo. For each iteration scenario
of rabies incursion, above-mentioned assignment of the numbers
of human bite injuries for all the rabid dogs was done for 1000
times, which produced 1000 scenarios of total numbers of bite
injuries by an incursion. As final epidemic size of dog rabies
was simulated for 1000 iterations, in total 1 million estimates of
numbers of bite injuries were generated, and injuries per outbreak
summarised (mean, median and 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles), for
both prefectures.
Sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity analyses were performed for four parameters using
the default Ibaraki model under current vaccination coverage: R0,
vaccination coverage, the unintended release of a rabid dog by
their owner and preferential contact by rabid stray dogs. The
value space of the four parameters was summarised in Table 4.
Smaller values than the default setting at 0.4 intervals were pre-
pared for R0, as the values reported worldwide tend to be smaller
than our default [17]. The probability that a rabid stray dog
selects a stray dog to bite, 0.9% was taken from the proportion
of stray dogs among all dogs in Ibaraki Prefectures, so that the
selection behaviour for a stray rabid dog becomes equivalent of
that of an owned rabid dog. Ibaraki Prefecture model with current
vaccination coverage was used for the sensitivity analyses, and the
1000 iterations were performed for each condition.
To assess the contribution of stray dogs in an epidemic further,
the relationship between outbreak size and the proportion of
rabid dogs that were stray was examined using a generalised linear
model with quasi-binomial errors, using the Ibaraki model with
vaccination coverage 0%, and 1000 iterations.
Results
Parameter estimation
Estimated parameter values for rabid dog movement (α, δ, ε)
from fitting the model to the historical Osaka outbreak data are
reported in Table 2. We found no significant difference between
numbers of observed and simulated rabies cases (P = 0.8).
Risk assessment
The mean outbreak sizes, including the index cases, in Hokkaido
and Ibaraki Prefectures under current vaccination coverage were
3.1 (median 2; range 1–27; 95% CI 1–14) and 4.7 (median 2;
range 1–106; 95% CI 1–37), respectively (Fig. 2a and b), with
6.9% and 9.0% of outbreaks ⩾10 cases. The mean epidemic dura-
tions were 55.3 days (median 31; range 1–537; 95% CI 1–269) and
68.2 days (median 31; range 1–610; 95% CI 1–369) in respective
prefectures.
In a scenario inwhich annualmandatory vaccinationwas discon-
tinued, outbreaks were larger, with a mean of 22.8 (median 4; range
1–225; 95% CI 1–142) and 21.7 (median 4; range 1–152; 95% CI 1–
110) rabid dogs in Hokkaido and Ibaraki Prefectures (Fig. 2c and d,
Table 4), with 35.5% and 35.1% of outbreaks ⩾10 cases.
The increase of time between the onset of the index dog and
the detection from 30 to 90 days increased the final outbreak
size, but the probability of outbreaks ⩾10 cases remained
unchanged (Table 4).
Emergency responses (increasing capacities for detecting rabid
and rabies-contacted dogs, capturing stray dogs and performing
Table 3. The parameter set of each scenario for rabies control options
Scenario Change of parameter values
Delay of initial response Start of initial response at day 90
Increasing capacity of detecting rabid and contacted dogs Probability of detection: 80%
Increasing capacity of capturing stray dogs Capturing 20 dogs per day
Increasing capacity of emergency dog vaccination Vaccinating 200 dogs per day
Table 4. Scenario analysis results of final size and duration of the epidemic in Ibaraki Prefecture (vaccination coverage: 0%)
Scenario
Final size
Epidemic period in
days (95% CI)Mean (95% CI) Range
Probability of secondary
cases (95% CI)
Default setting 21.7 (1–110) 1–152 35.1% (32.2–38.2) 152.5 (1–581)
Delayed initial response 22.9 (1–119) 1–157 38.6% (35.6–41.7) 166.0 (1–549)
Increasing capacity of detecting
rabid and contacted dogs
20.1 (1–103) 1–166 36.0% (33.0–39.1) 149.1 (1–578)
Increasing capacity of capturing stray dogs 22.5 (1–117) 1–175 39.2% (36.2–42.3) 162.3 (1–574)
Increasing capacity of emergency vaccination 22.7 (1–114) 1–160 39.2% (36.2–42.3) 161.6 (1–534)
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emergency vaccinations) did not affect the outbreak sizes, or the
proportion of outbreaks with ⩾10 cases (Table 4).
In the 116 records of bite injuries caused by individual rabid
dogs, the average number of people bitten by a rabid dog was 5.5
(median 3; range 1–46; 95% CI 1–29). The mean numbers of
rabid dog bite injuries per incursion in Hokkaido and Ibaraki
Prefectures under current vaccination coverage were estimated to
be 4.4 (median 0; range 0–210; 95% CI 0–35) and 6.7 (median 0;
range 0–312; 95%CI 0–58), respectively, by the stochastic approach,
and 2.6 (median 2; range 1–22; 95% CI 1–12) and 3.9 (median 2;
range 1–88; 95% CI 1–31), respectively, by the ratio approach.
Sensitivity analysis
Table 5 shows the sensitivity analysis results. The smaller R0 pro-
duced smaller epidemic sizes than the default, but even R0 1.6 still
showed the possibility of over 10 cases. Discontinuation of man-
datory vaccination or further decrease of vaccination coverage to
30% was sensitive to the epidemic size, though the size was still
limited. Epidemic sizes were sensitive to the probability of unin-
tentionally releasing a rabid owned dog when the probability
was increased to 90%. However, smaller probabilities did not
change the epidemic sizes very much. Assuming rabid stray
dogs were more likely to contact other stray dogs rather than
owned dogs had little impact on outbreak sizes when the result
of default 50% was compared with the scenario of the probability
of selection of stray dogs to bite based on the proportion of stray
dogs out of total dog population (0.9%). However, the scenario
that a rabid stray dog selects stray dog to bite at 90% chance pro-
duced larger outbreak (mean 11.3 cases). In the separate analysis
using GLM, a positive relationship was observed between out-
break size and the proportion of stray dogs among rabies cases
in the vaccination coverage 0% setting (slope of logit = 0.01,
standard error = 0.0008, P < 0.01, Fig. 3).
Discussion
Risk assessment using mathematical modelling is useful for plan-
ning disease control options, as models can demonstrate the
potential outcomes of an introduction of an infectious disease
and the changes on risk achieved by application of counter
Fig. 2. Predicted outbreak sizes in Hokkaido (a) and Ibaraki (b) Prefectures under current vaccination coverage, and without vaccination (c and d). Dashed and
solid arrows shows the 97.5th percentile and maximum of final size.
Table 5. Sensitivity analysis results
Parameter
Value
space
Mean
(95% CI) Range
Reproduction number 1.2 1.9 (1–6) 1–15
1.6 2.7 (1–11) 1–51
2.0 3.9 (1–23) 1–89
2.42a 4.7 (1–37) 1–106
Vaccination coverage 0% 21.7 (1–110) 1–152
30% 11.4 (1–75) 1–124
51.8%a 4.7 (1–37) 1–106
70% 3.2 (1–17) 1–82
Probability of releasing a
rabid owned dog
5% 3.1 (1–11) 1–62
10% 3.3 (1–13) 1–114
50%a 4.7 (1–37) 1–106
90% 12.0 (1–81) 1–126
Probability that a rabid stray
dog selects a stray dog to
bite
0.9% 3.8 (1–18) 1–50
10% 4.0 (1–19) 1–53
50%a 4.7 (1–37) 1–106
90% 11.3 (1–154) 1–204
aDefault values for Ibaraki model with current vaccination coverage.
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measures. Our study provides important messages, regarding
responses to, and contingency planning for rabies incursions.
The risk of an incursion resulting in an outbreak of 10 or more
dog rabies cases was assessed to be between 6.9% and 9.0% under
current vaccination coverage and dog-keeping practices in Japan.
Outbreaks would therefore typically be limited, but due to the
extended rabies incubation period (15.5 days) [21], once second-
ary cases occur, the duration of the epidemic can become long.
The final size of outbreaks was strongly affected by reactions of
dog owners if their dogs developed rabies. Even under the current
vaccination coverage, a 90% chance of releasing rabid dogs could
prolong the epidemic to more than a year. Thus, sensitisation of
dog owners about rabies and recommended actions when rabies is
detected is critical. Direct reporting of suspicious signs of rabies to
local authorities may be better than bringing symptomatic dogs to
veterinary clinics, as such transport incurs additional risks.
Veterinary clinicians should, of course, also be reminded to sus-
pect the possibility of rabies.
Our results showed that mandatory vaccination for prevention
of rabies limits the risk from incursions. R0 reported worldwide is
generally smaller than the value we used [17], and sensitivity ana-
lysis on R0 showed that the outbreak size may be even smaller.
Smaller epidemic size in Hokkaido Prefecture than in Ibaraki
Prefecture under current vaccination coverage may be due to
higher vaccination coverage in Hokkaido, as the epidemic size
under vaccination coverage 0% in Hokkaido was larger than
that in Ibaraki. However, the cost-effectiveness of mandatory vac-
cination should be carefully discussed, as it incurs expenses for
both dog owners and public services, and the risk of rabies intro-
duction is very low [8]. Obviously, accumulated cost of manda-
tory vaccination over many years including future is bigger
than that of contingency measures, which had not incurred
since elimination in Japan. On the other hand, costs of control
can be large without mandatory vaccination as epidemic size
may be larger at an incursion. Thus, discussions on rabies control
options taking risks of both rabies introduction and spread into
account are needed. Most rabies-free countries, such as UK
[22, 23], France [24] and Australia [25], do not use mandatory
dog vaccination.
Our assessment of the efficacy of rabies control measures did
not show any clear benefit to strengthening contingency plans.
By default, we modelled a delay of 30 days from detection to
initial response. It is assumed that an even earlier initial response,
i.e. immediate capture of the primary case would prevent second-
ary cases. The result showed that once initial response was delayed
for a month, further delay would not markedly change the final
outbreak size. It should be noted that in settings where rabies out-
breaks have been reported in previously rabies-free areas, delays to
detection and response have far exceeded 60 days [26], which was
the worst-case scenario that we examined. Scenarios with
increased capacities for finding contacted dogs, and implementing
emergency vaccination employed realistic assumptions. In the
case of a dog rabies outbreak, once it has spread to a dog popu-
lation, it may become challenging to contain in a short period,
unless response capacity is dramatically strengthened, as realistic
strengthening of contingency plans did not substantially change
the final size in the model. The relationship between the outbreak
sizes and the proportion of strays among rabid dogs suggested
that larger epidemics are likely to be associated with rabies spread
among the stray dog population. The sensitivity analysis also
showed that when rabid stray dogs spread the disease within
the sub-population, outbreak size may become larger. Control
of stray dogs is therefore an important defence against rabies
spread. The effect of stray dog population control was shown dur-
ing historical outbreaks in Osaka Prefecture [13].
As suggested in a study in Tanzania [20], not all rabid dogs
bite people, and the estimated number of bite injury cases by
rabid dogs would be small under the current situation.
However, under a small probability of large-scale outbreak,
large number of bite injury cases may occur, as numbers of dog
bite injury cases were positively correlated with dog rabies cases
in historical outbreaks in Osaka [13]. A previous study found
that 0–60% of people develop rabies after being bitten by a
rabid dog if untreated, and the probability depends on the site
of bite [27]. Awareness of rabies is thought to be low among
Japanese citizens; only half of Japanese travellers bitten by stray
or domestic dogs in rabies-endemic countries obtained post-
exposure prophylaxis [28]. Therefore, given these vulnerabilities
associated with low awareness, introduction of a rabid dog to
Japan would pose a non-trivial risk of human death.
There are four points to be discussed with regard to the valid-
ity of our mathematical model. First, we used R0 from the histor-
ical epidemic in Osaka Prefecture, where many stray and
unleashed dogs were present. It is therefore likely that contact
rates may have been higher than they are currently, however, evi-
dence suggests that R0 does not depend on dog population density
[29]. In current Japan, most dogs are kept inside, and the risk of
rabies spread would be underestimated if R0 is assumed to be
density-dependent. We assumed frequency-dependent transmis-
sion and therefore that a rabid dog in present day Japan would
infect the same number of dogs as in the past. Instead of changing
R0 to reflect the difference of dog population density from the
past, we did model the probability of unintentionally releasing a
rabid dog, because all owned dogs are leashed in present day
Japan. We used the default 50% for this probability; however,
owned dogs in Japan are generally paid good attention, and the
probability may be lower. The sensitivity analysis showed rela-
tively small change in the outbreak size at 5% and 10% scenarios
for this probability.
The second point bearing on the validity of our model is our
method for determining the geographical locations of cases. The
fitted parameter α that relates the distance kernel and dog density
had an influence of 50% on determining case locations. We are
limited in our estimation, in that we did not have the exact case
locations or knowledge of who-bit-whom from the historical
Fig. 3. Relationship between the final outbreak size and the proportion of stray dogs
among dog rabies cases using the Ibaraki Prefecture model with preferential biting of
stray dogs under 0% vaccination coverage. The solid line is the predicted value based
on a logistic regression, and grey area shows the 95% confidence interval of the
regression parameters.
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data, but our results indicate that in the setting of a large-scale
epidemic, more cases will be observed in areas with high dog
population densities. It should be noted that this dog population
dependency is on the geographical allocation of rabid dogs, and
not about the value of R0, which was discussed above. The adjust-
ment parameter (ε = 1.1) from the distance kernel showed that
distances between index and secondary cases were comparable
between Osaka and Tanzania [15].
The third point is about the probability of a rabid dog biting at
least one person. This information is not available in Japan, and
we used data from Tanzania [20]. The number of bite injuries
simulated using these data was comparable to the results using
the bite–dog rabies ratio in the past Osaka outbreak [13], suggest-
ing reasonable prediction.
Another limitation is that our model does not take into
account recreation activities that might facilitate rabies transmis-
sion in modern society, such as running facilities for dogs and
dog socialisation in parks. Our results should therefore be inter-
preted with caution, as transmissions in potential hotspots
could result in unexpectedly large epidemics.
In conclusion, following a rabies incursion into Japan, out-
break sizes are expected to be limited. Reactions of owner to
their dog developing rabies were the most influential factor for
outbreak control. Rabies education should therefore be targeted
to veterinarians, veterinary students and pet owners, as well as
to the general public. Our results suggest that outbreak response
capacity is currently strong, but that maintenance efforts should
not be relaxed. Discussions of mandatory vaccination mainten-
ance should be encouraged, and such discourse must acknowledge
and evaluate overall risks considering both introduction and
spread of rabies, and cost-effectiveness.
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